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Abstract This article argues that State autonomy in setting the level of protection for 
permissible regulatory aims can be better operationalized in the investment treaty 
regime. The article draws on comparative insights from WTO law, where it is 
established that WTO members have the right to determine the level of protection for 
permissible regulatory aims, although significant disciplines are placed on the means 
used to achieve those aims. It is then argued that investment treaties are, properly 
interpreted, consistent with the idea that States retain autonomy to determine the level 
of protection for permissible regulatory aims. Finally, the article proposes removing 
from the fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation standards 
proportionality balancing stricto sensu, as this undermines State autonomy in setting 
the level of protection. Overall, this article argues for a partial reorientation of 
investment law, in which non-discriminatory measures that pursue a permissible 
regulatory aim, including at a particular level, should not amount to a breach of a treaty 
where a State uses the means that involve the least possible restriction of the competing 
interests protected by relevant investment treaty obligations. 
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The freedom of States to determine their own regulatory goals and to implement policies to 
pursue those goals, while nevertheless complying with their obligations under trade and 
investment treaties, remains a fundamental question in international economic law.1 One key 
aspect of this freedom is the ability of States to determine the level at which they will pursue 
permissible regulatory aims. For example, a State may take measures to protect human health 
against a particular risk and aim to reduce that risk ‘to the maximum extent possible’.2 In WTO 
law, this concept is referred to as the ‘level of protection’ selected by a WTO member. In short, 
while various disciplines are imposed by the WTO agreements, members retain the right to 
 
* Lecturer in Law, University of Bristol, joshua.paine@bristol.ac.uk. For comments on prior drafts, I thank 
Caroline Foster, Clair Gammage, Caroline Henckels, Elizabeth Sheargold, two anonymous reviewers and the 
editors. The usual disclaimer applies.  
1 A Mitchell, E Sheargold and T Voon, Regulatory Autonomy in International Economic Law: The Evolution of 
Australian Policy on Trade and Investment (Edward Elgar 2017) 2, 6. B Natens, Regulatory Autonomy and 
International Trade in Services: The EU Under GATS and RTAs (Edward Elgar 2016) 2–6. 
2 Panel Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/R, adopted 17 December 
2007, para 7.108. Consider also Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, para 168; Appellate Body Report, 
Korea – Import Bans, and Testing and Certification Requirements for Radionuclides, WT/DS495/AB/R, adopted 




select their own level of protection for permissible regulatory aims, such as the protection of 
human health, the environment or public morals.3 Any alternative, less trade restrictive 
measures proposed by a complainant must ‘preserve for the responding Member its right to 
achieve its desired level of protection with respect to the objective pursued’.4  
Various provisions in newer investment treaties, and remarks by investor-sate tribunals, 
provide support for the idea that despite having undertaken investment protection obligations, 
as in the WTO context, States retain substantial autonomy in selecting which regulatory aims 
to pursue and the level at which to pursue permissible aims. Less unambiguously, in Opinion 
1/17, the Court of Justice of the European Union held that the investor-State tribunals created 
under the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European 
Union (CETA) were not empowered to call into question the level of protection of public 
interests adopted by European Union (EU) institutions, with the result that CETA’s investor-
State dispute settlement provisions did not adversely affect the autonomy of the EU legal 
order.5 However, whether the relevant provisions of CETA actually support that proposition is 
debatable.6 
If States retain the right to select the desired level of protection for permissible policy 
aims, this would have major implications for how investment treaties should be interpreted and 
applied, and for the appropriate role of investor-State tribunals.7 Similarly to Michael Ming 
Du’s observation in relation to WTO law, a first key implication would be that all of the 
obligations imposed by investment treaties would need to be interpreted and applied in light of 
a State’s ability to choose its own level of protection for permissible regulatory aims.8 
Secondly, the role for international scrutiny by investor-State tribunals would be limited. While 
tribunals could scrutinize whether the means employed by a State to achieve its desired level 
of protection comply with investment treaty disciplines, they could not second guess the level 
 
3 See eg Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, 
adopted 17 December 2007, paras 140, 210. Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, adopted 20 April 2005, para 6.461, affirmed in Appellate 
Body Reports, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, 
WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted 18 June 2014, para 5.200. Panel Report, China – Measures 
Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products, WT/DS363/R, adopted 19 January 2010, para 7.819. 
4 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005, para 308. Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres 
(n 3) para 156. 
5 CJEU Opinion 1/17 (2019) EU:C:2019:341, paras 148–61. Riffel suggests that from an EU law perspective, the 
Opinion elevates the EU’s autonomy in determining the level of protection to a constitutional requirement in order 
for the EU to be able to accede to an international agreement: C Riffel, ‘The CETA Opinion of the European 
Court of Justice and Its Implications—Not That Selfish After All’ (2019) 22 JIEL 503, 519–21. Fanou highlights 
that this aspect of Opinion 1/17 lays the basis for respondents to challenge the enforcement of investor-State 
awards within the EU, in cases concerning an EU-level measure or the implementation of EU law by Member 
States, on the basis that the interpretation contained in the award undermines the EU’s autonomy in setting the 
level of protection for public interests. Importantly, this reasoning may apply to the extra-EU investment treaties 
of EU Member States, as well as to a future multilateral investment court: M Fanou, ‘The CETA ICS and the 
Autonomy of the EU Legal Order in Opinion 1/17 – A Compass for the Future’ (2020) 22 Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies 106, 127–31. Contrast C Titi, ‘Opinion 1/17 and the Future of Investment Dispute 
Settlement: Implications for the Design of a Multilateral Investment Court’ in L Sachs, L Johnson and J Coleman 
(eds), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2019 (OUP 2021) 533–6. 
6 See also GC Leonelli, ‘CETA and the External Autonomy of the EU Legal Order: Risk Regulation as a Test’ 
(2020) 47 LIEI 43, 52–4, 61–8 (suggesting that CETA’s investor-State tribunals may in practice affect the EU’s 
ability to set the level of protection, eg in the context of precautionary measures without a clear scientific basis). 
7 M Ming Du, ‘Autonomy in Setting Appropriate Level of Protection under the WTO Law: Rhetoric or Reality?’ 





of protection a State pursues for a permissible regulatory aim.9 Nevertheless, it must be 
acknowledged that, as Du argues in the WTO context, the autonomy of States to select the level 
of protection for permissible regulatory aims, and the disciplines imposed by international 
agreements on the means by which the chosen level of protection is pursued, ‘are in a constant 
state of tension’.10  
This article makes the case that investment treaties should be interpreted in a manner 
that preserves States’ autonomy to select the desired level of protection for permissible 
regulatory aims.11 It will show that the basis that has been laid within key standards of 
investment protection for proportionality balancing stricto sensu means there is an increasing 
potential that investment treaties may be interpreted in ways that undermine a State’s ability to 
pursue a desired level of protection for permissible regulatory aims. This article advocates a 
partial reorientation of investment law, in which non-discriminatory measures that pursue a 
permissible regulatory aim (eg the protection of human health or the environment), including 
at a particular level (eg a policy of zero risk), should not give rise to a breach of treaty, where 
a State uses the means that involve the least possible restriction of the competing interests 
protected by relevant investment treaty obligations. This would amount to introducing a greater 
hierarchy of values than currently exists under most investment treaties, in which legitimate 
public welfare interests would be given clearer priority over the interest of investment 
protection. Nevertheless, the article will demonstrate that there is already a basis in newer 
investment treaties for the idea that public welfare interests, such as the protection of the 
environment or public health, can at times take priority over investment protection.  
This article builds on prior suggestions, in both the WTO and investment treaty 
contexts, that the balancing techniques employed by adjudicators have a particular relationship 
with autonomy in setting the level of protection. Proportionality balancing stricto sensu 
involves weighing the costs and benefits of an impugned measure in all the circumstances and 
undermines State autonomy in setting the level of protection. Least restrictive means testing 
takes the regulatory goal pursued by a State as a given, and asks if it could be achieved through 
means that are less restrictive of other legally protected interests, and this respects domestic 
autonomy in setting the level of protection.12  
It is argued that, in the investment treaty context, autonomy in determining the level of 
protection for permissible regulatory aims is appropriate because investment treaties do not 
evidence any intention to harmonize domestic regulatory standards and, on the contrary, 




11 Generally, I use the term investment treaties as a shorthand to refer to both Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
and investment chapters in wider Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), although where necessary I differentiate the 
two. 
12 See eg JHH Weiler, ‘Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (DS322)’ (2009) 8 World Trade 
Review 137, 139–40. CI Nagy, ‘Clash of Trade and National Public Interest in WTO Law: The Illusion of 
“Weighing and Balancing” and the Theory of Reservation’ (2020) 23 JIEL 143, 148–9. J Kurtz, ‘Adjudging the 





some degree of control over the means utilized.13 In other words, investment treaties should be 
understood, like the WTO Agreements, as permitting regulatory diversity.14  
Nevertheless, under the approach advanced in this article adjudicators would retain a 
residual role in scrutinizing whether a regulatory aim pursued by a State is a permissible one, 
for example in the context of a particular investment treaty. However, as investment treaties 
are generally consistent with States pursing a wide range of policy aims, this stage of the 
analysis would be limited to excluding measures that predominantly serve impermissible aims, 
such as protectionist or discriminatory measures. The overall claim of this article, concerning 
autonomy in setting the level of protection for permissible regulatory aims, is most directly 
relevant to those investor-State cases that involve a challenge to a State’s laws or regulations, 
as these will typically reflect a particular level of protection the State has pursued for the 
relevant regulatory aim.15 However, this analysis is also relevant for some disputes where an 
investor challenges more individualized administrative treatment, as, in certain cases, such 
treatment is based on a particular level of protection that a State has adopted for a permissible 
regulatory aim, such as the protection of human health or the environment.16 
The article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly reviews what is meant by the expression 
‘level of protection’, to aid a clear understanding for the purposes of the subsequent analysis. 
Part III considers the concept of State autonomy in setting the level of protection as developed 
in WTO law, through an examination of the necessity jurisprudence developed across several 
covered agreements. WTO law is drawn on as a comparator because it provides a rich 
repository of experience in balancing treaty-protected economic interests (the interest of trade 
 
13 Harmonization can be defined ‘as the process of making different regulations, principles, domestic laws and 
government policies substantially or effectively the same or similar’: G Mayeda, ‘Developing Disharmony? The 
SPS and TBT Agreements and the Impact of Harmonization on Developing Countries’ (2004) 7 JIEL 737, 740. 
See generally DW Leebron, ‘Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization Claims’ in JN Bhagwati 
and RE Hudec (eds), Fair Trade & Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol 1: Economic Analysis (MIT 
Press 1996) 43–8. Some degree of harmonization does not necessarily prevent States from being permitted to 
adopt a higher level of protection, subject to being able to justify the need for it, as both the WTO’s TBT and SPS 
Agreements demonstrate: T Cottier and B Imeli, ‘Harmonization’ in T Cottier and K Nadakavukaren Schefer 
(eds), Elgar Encyclopedia of International Economic Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 59–60. Conceptually, 
autonomy in setting the level of protection is consistent with a ‘host country control’ model of economic 
integration, whereby States retain the ability to set the standards that will apply to economic activity on their 
territory, subject to compliance with agreed international disciplines: J Snell, ‘The Internal Market and the 
Philosophies of Market Integration’ in C Barnard and S Peers (eds), European Union Law (3rd edn, OUP 2020) 
335–8. See also AO Sykes, ‘The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International Goods and Services 
Markets’ (1999) 2 JIEL 49, 61–5 (discussing a model of ‘policed decentralization’ whereby States have ‘the 
freedom to pursue different goals or different levels of regulatory stringency’, subject to certain disciplines, such 
as non-discrimination and use of the least restrictive means). 
14 On the point that the WTO Agreements have been interpreted to permit regulatory diversity, see eg PC 
Mavroidis, The Regulation of International Trade, vol 1 (MIT Press 2016) 420. R Howse, J Langille and K Sykes, 
‘Pluralism in Practice: Moral Legislation and the Law of the WTO after Seal Products’ (2015) 48 GWILR 81, 
89–91. On the rationale for permitting regulatory diversity, subject to certain constraints (eg non-discrimination 
and use of the least trade restrictive means), see eg AO Sykes, ‘The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization 
in International Goods and Services Markets’ (n 13). M Trebilcock and R Howse, ‘Trade Liberalization and 
Regulatory Diversity: Reconciling Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics’ (1998) 6 European Journal of 
Law and Economics 5, 28, 31–2. 
15 Consider eg Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v Uruguay, ICSID Case No ARB/10/7, Award (8 July 2016) (plain 
packaging regulations for tobacco products given public health concerns); Methanex Corporation v USA, 
UNCITRAL, Final Award (3 August 2005) pt II, ch D, paras 2–22 (ban on the sale and use of a gasoline additive 
given environmental and public health concerns). 
16 Consider eg Chemtura Corporation (formerly Crompton Corporation) v Canada, UNCITRAL, Award (2 
August 2010) paras 6–49 (dispute over regulatory process involving ban on claimant’s pesticide products); David 
R. Aven v Costa Rica, ICSID Case No UNCT/15/3, Award (18 September 2018) paras 415–587 (dispute 




liberalization), with non-trade interests that are also recognized as legitimate by the relevant 
agreements. Part IV makes the case that investment treaties are, properly interpreted, consistent 
with the idea that States retain autonomy to select and implement a desired level of protection 
for permissible regulatory goals, despite investment treaty obligations constraining the means 
through which those goals may be pursued. Part V turns to some key areas where further 
attention is required to protect States’ autonomy in selecting and implementing a desired level 
of protection for permissible regulatory aims. Specifically, this Part demonstrates that within 
the fair and equitable treatment (FET) and indirect expropriation standards, recent case law and 
treaty drafting approaches have established a basis for proportionality balancing stricto sensu, 
and thus for adjudicators potentially second-guessing a State’s chosen level of protection for 
permissible regulatory aims. It provides suggestions concerning how treaty drafters can address 
this emerging problem by limiting the FET and indirect expropriation standards to a least 
restrictive means test. Part VI concludes. 
 
II. DEFINING THE ‘LEVEL OF PROTECTION’ 
 
This short Part unpacks what is meant when referring to the level of protection, an 
understanding of which is crucial for the subsequent analysis. Most commonly, the term ‘level 
of protection’ refers to the degree to which a particular regulatory aim, recognized as 
permissible in a particular context (eg by a treaty), is fulfilled.17 For example, WTO panels and 
the Appellate Body (AB) have accepted that the various regulatory aims recognized as 
permissible by Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Article 
XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and Article 2.2 of the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), such as the protection of public health or 
public morals, can be fulfilled to varying degrees.18 Likewise, the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) defines the term 
‘appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection’ as ‘[t]he level of protection deemed 
appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health within its territory’.19 A note attached to this definition adds that 
‘Many Members otherwise refer to this concept as the “acceptable level of risk”’.20 However, 
as Jeffery Atik highlights, an acceptable level of risk is not the same as the level of protection 
pursued by a regulator. Rather, the former refers to the degree of residual risk that is left, after 
mitigation measures have been implemented, whereas the level of protection concerns the 
extent to which a member chooses to reduce a particular risk.21  
Another important distinction to appreciate is the difference between a level of 
protection that may be intended by a regulator when formulating regulatory aims and selecting 
measures to achieve those aims, and the level of protection actually achieved by a measure. As 
will be seen, at times the ‘level of protection’ is used to refer to a particular degree of fulfilment 
of a legitimate regulatory aim (eg protection of public health) intended by a regulator ex ante. 
Used in this way, the level of protection is a distinct issue within the broader question of what 
may constitute a legitimate regulatory aim.  
 
17 CP Bown and JP Trachtman, ‘Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres: A Balancing Act’ (2009) 
8 World Trade Review 85, 124. B McGrady, ‘Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory 
Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory Measures’ (2009) 12 JIEL 153, 157. 
18 See below text at n 34–5, 37, 58. 
19 SPS Agreement, Annex A para 5. 
20 ibid. 
21 J Atik, ‘On the Efficiency of Health Measures and the “Appropriate Level of Protection”’ in G van Calster and 




However, the level of protection intended by a regulator may differ from that achieved 
by a measure, as implemented. As will be demonstrated below, in some contexts the focus is 
on the level of protection achieved, for example the extent to which a contested measure, as 
implemented, reduces a particular risk to human health. Indeed, many would suggest that a 
State whose measures are being scrutinized should not be permitted to assert a higher level of 
protection than that achieved by the impugned measures.22 A further point to note is that in 
practice regulators often do not determine a desired level of protection prior to selecting 
regulatory measures.23 In these cases, subsequent scrutiny of a State’s measures (eg by an 
international adjudicator) has to focus on the level of protection achieved. The level of 
protection will be deduced from, and identical to, the measure itself.24 
 
III. AUTONOMY IN SETTING THE LEVEL OF PROTECTION IN WTO LAW 
 
This Part analyzes the idea, developed in WTO law, that WTO members retain the freedom to 
select the level at which they will pursue permissible regulatory objectives. This comparative 
analysis can shed light on areas where investment treaties, and investor-State tribunals, could 
be more attentive to the right of States to determine and implement their own regulatory goals, 
including a specific level of protection for permissible regulatory aims. While contextual 
differences between international trade and investment law must be kept in mind, there is a 
sound rationale for drawing on WTO law as a comparator, as it provides a rich repository of 
experience in responding to the challenge of respecting domestic autonomy in setting 
regulatory aims while nevertheless enforcing treaty disciplines on the means utilized to pursue 
those aims.25 Indeed, some suggest that the challenge facing adjudicators of balancing ‘market 
values and regulatory ideals’ can produce a deep level of convergence between interpretative 
approaches in the international trade and investment regimes that is not ‘provision specific’.26 
While the concept of the ‘level of protection’ has the strongest textual basis in the SPS 
Agreement, it has also been drawn upon in jurisprudence under the GATT, GATS, and TBT 
Agreement. In the latter contexts there is either no or a more limited textual basis for the idea 
that members have the right to determine the desired level of protection for permissible 
regulatory aims.27 Nevertheless, it is clear that ‘the fundamental principle is the right that WTO 
Members have to determine the level of protection that they consider appropriate in a given 
context’.28 Thus, Petros Mavroidis observes in relation to the concept of necessity, as developed 
in GATT Article XX jurisprudence: ‘WTO adjudicating bodies have consistently held that their 
power of review extends only to means employed. The choice of ends (including the level of 
enforcement) is the exclusive privilege of WTO members’.29 
 
 
22 DH Regan, ‘The Meaning of “Necessary” in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost–
Benefit Balancing’ (2007) 6 WTR 347, 359–60 fn 17. Bown and Trachtman (n 17) 124, 129. 
23 Atik (n 21) 122. Weiler (n 12) 144. 
24 Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R, 
adopted 24 April 2012, para 7.375. 
25 See eg J Kurtz, The WTO and International Investment Law: Converging Systems (CUP 2016) 280–2. AD 
Mitchell and C Henckels, ‘Variations on a Theme: Comparing the Concept of “Necessity” in International 
Investment Law and WTO Law’ (2013) 14 Chicago Journal of International Law 93, 162–4. S Cho and J Kurtz, 
‘Convergence and Divergence in International Economic Law and Politics’ (2018) 29 EJIL 169, 197. 
26 Cho and Kurtz (n 25) 170–1, 197. 
27 The term appears in the preamble to the TBT Agreement: see below text at n 48. The term does not appear in 
GATT or GATS but has been drawn on in interpreting those agreements: Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes (n 
24) para 7.370. 
28 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (n 3) para 210. 




A. GATT Article XX/GATS Article XIV 
 
The concept of the level of protection has been repeatedly drawn upon within the 
necessity test developed under GATT Article XX(a), (b) and (d) and its GATS equivalents. 
The necessity analysis under these provisions has been interpreted to require ‘a process of 
“weighing and balancing” a series of factors, including the importance of the societal interest 
or value at stake, the contribution of the measure to the objective it pursues, and the trade-
restrictiveness of the measure’.30 ‘In most cases, a comparison between the challenged measure 
and possible [less trade-restrictive] alternatives should subsequently be undertaken’.31 
Although the reference to ‘weighing and balancing’ and the importance of the interests at stake 
has at times been interpreted as signalling proportionality balancing stricto sensu, most 
commentators agree that in jurisprudence to date, WTO adjudicators have employed a form of 
least restrictive means testing, where the regulatory aim pursued by a member has not been 
questioned, and the importance of the relevant regulatory interests can provide an additional 
margin of appreciation, which makes it easier for a member to establish that its measures are 
necessary.32 
In order to qualify as a genuine alternative, any proposed alternative measure must 
allow the responding member to achieve its desired level of protection for the relevant policy 
objective.33 For example, in the context of GATT Article XX(a) and GATS Article XIV(a), 
WTO adjudicators have emphasized that ‘Members have the right to determine the level of 
protection that they consider appropriate’ in relation to issues of public moral concern.34 In the 
context of GATT Article XX(b), the AB has noted that ‘WTO Members have the right to 
determine the level of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation’.35 
Scrutiny instead focuses on whether the measures adopted by a member are necessary to 
achieve its chosen level of protection, or whether alternative, less trade restrictive measures 
could achieve the member’s desired level of protection.36 Similarly, in the context of GATT 
Article XX(d), the AB has noted ‘[i]t is not open to doubt that Members … have the right to 
 
30 Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles, Apparel and Footwear, 
WT/DS461/AB/R, adopted 22 June 2016 para 5.70. Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products (n 3) para 5.169. 
Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (n 3) para 156. Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling (n 4) 
paras 305–6. 
31 Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles (n 30) para 5.70. Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling (n 4) 
para 307. Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, 
WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, para 166. 
32 See eg Mitchell and Henckels (n 25) 128–30, 135, 149–50. M Du, ‘The Necessity Test in World Trade Law: 
What Now?’ (2016) 15 Chinese JIL 817, 825–7, 835. P Van den Bossche, ‘Looking for Proportionality in WTO 
Law’ (2008) 35 LIEI 283, 289–93. Regan (n 22) 348–60. Contrast F Fontanelli, ‘Necessity Killed the GATT: Art 
XX GATT and the Misleading Rhetoric About “Weighing and Balancing”’ (2012) 4 EJLS 39, 58, 65–6, 68. AO 
Sykes, ‘The Least Restrictive Means’ (2003) 70 The University of Chicago Law Review 403, 415–16. 
33 Additionally, a proposed alternative measure will not qualify as ‘reasonably available’ ‘where the responding 
Member is not capable of taking it, or where the alternative imposes an undue burden on that Member, such as 
prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties’: Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling (n 4) para 308, 
affirmed in Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (n 3) para 156, and Appellate Body Report, China 
– Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual 
Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2010, para 318.  
34 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products (n 3) para 5.200, citing Panel Report, United States – Gambling  
(n 3) para 6.461. Panel Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products (n 3) para 7.819. 
35 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos (n 3) para 168. Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (n 3) 
para 140. 




determine for themselves the level of enforcement of their WTO-consistent laws and 
regulations’.37  
Importantly, it is ultimately for a panel or the AB, not the responding member, to 
determine the level of protection that was pursued by a member.38 In this regard, Korea-Beef 
is a particularly controversial ruling because the AB restated the level of protection that was 
pursued by Korea at a lower level than that which Korea had claimed.39 The GATT Article 
XX/GATS Article XIV case law is not entirely clear on how the level of protection asserted by 
a responding member interacts with the level of protection achieved by the impugned measures. 
Some statements appear to suggest that the level of protection is an aspect of the member’s 
regulatory aim, essentially concerning the level at which a member decides to pursue a 
particular policy goal, and is analytically separate from the measures adopted to achieve that 
level of protection.40 However, much of the case law suggests that the level of protection is 
closely related to the contribution that a member’s measures make to the relevant policy 
objective, with any proposed alternative, less trade-restrictive measures needing to ‘make a 
contribution that is at least equivalent to that’ made by the impugned measures.41  
This ambiguity in the GATT Article XX/GATS Article XIV necessity jurisprudence, 
concerning whether the focus is on the level of protection intended ex ante, or the degree of 
contribution to the relevant aim actually achieved, is a potential weakness of the WTO 
approach drawn on by this article for comparative inspiration. Nevertheless, the weight of the 
GATT Article XX/GATS Article XIV necessity jurisprudence focuses on the level of 
protection achieved by a measure, as implemented, a position that is also clearly endorsed by 
the necessity jurisprudence under the TBT Agreement, considered next. As will be explained 
below, this article suggests that in the investment treaty context, the focus should also be on 
the level of protection achieved by the impugned measure(s). 
Another potential difficulty of transplanting the approach found in WTO necessity 
jurisprudence to the level of protection to the investment treaty context is that, in practice, it 
can be difficult to pinpoint the level of protection, or degree of fulfilment of a permissible aim, 
achieved by a measure. This reflects that the goal pursued by a measure can often be stated at 
different levels of generality, and there may also be range of possible metrics for measuring 
the degree to which a measure achieves a particular aim.42 While this difficulty with the WTO 
approach is noteworthy, the case law considered in this subsection and the next (concerning 
the TBT Agreement) suggests that WTO adjudicators have been able to use the degree to which 
a measure contributes to a particular aim as a workable benchmark. For example, the AB has 
observed that to determine the objective of a measure and ‘the effectiveness of’ the 
respondent’s ‘regulatory approach’– ie the level of protection, as implemented – a panel may 
 
37 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Beef (n 31) para 176, drawing on GATT Panel Report, United States – Section 
337 of the Tariff Act 1930, L/6439 - 36S/345, adopted 7 November 1989, para 5.26. 
38 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling (n 4) para 304. G Marceau and JP Trachtman, ‘A Map of the World 
Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods: The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (2014) 48 
JWT 351, 386. McGrady (n 17) 156. 
39 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Beef (n 31) para 178 (finding in relation to the goal of eliminating fraud 
concerning the origin of beef sold in the retail market, Korea had not intended to ‘totally eliminate’ such fraud as 
opposed to ‘reduce [it] considerably’). Du (n 7) 1098. 
40 See eg Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (n 3) paras 140, 144–5, 210. 
41 eg Panel Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products (n 3) paras 7.888, 7.894, 7.898–9. Appellate 
Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, 
WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted 19 May 2005, paras 71–2. Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (n 3) para 
156. See also Appellate Body Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products (n 33) para 252.  
42 AD Mitchell and J Munro, ‘No Retreat: An Emerging Principle of Non-Regression from Environmental 
Protections in International Investment Law’ (2019) 50 Geo J Intl L 625, 660–2 (flagging a similar problem in 




consider the ‘texts of statutes, legislative history, and pronouncements of government agencies 
or officials’, as well as ‘the structure and operation of the measure and … contrary evidence 
proffered by the complaining party’.43 Importantly, by referring to contemporaneous evidence, 
including concerning the operation of a measure, an adjudicator can reduce the potential for 
the respondent to offer strategic ‘post-hoc rationalizations’, which assert a higher level of 
protection than was actually pursued, after a dispute arises.44 The WTO experience also 
demonstrates that adjudicators will frequently consider expert evidence to inform their 
understanding of the level of protection achieved by an impugned measure or a proposed 
alternative.45 Overall, while the approach of the GATT/GATS case law to the issue of 
autonomy in setting the level of protection is not without difficulty, those difficulties are not 
so great as to suggest that the concept should not be drawn upon for comparative inspiration in 
the investment treaty context. 
 
B. TBT Agreement 
 
The idea that WTO members have the right to determine which policy objectives to pursue, 
and the level at which to do so, has also informed the necessity test under Article 2.2 of the 
TBT Agreement.46 By way of context, Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement provides that 
‘technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate 
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create’, and specifies a non-
exhaustive list of ‘legitimate objectives’.47 These include ‘national security requirements;  the 
prevention of deceptive practices;  protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or 
health, or the environment’. The sixth recital in the preamble of the TBT Agreement also states 
that: 
 no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality 
of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the 
environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the levels it considers 
appropriate, subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade, and 
are otherwise in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.48 
 
 
43 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling (n 4) para 304. 
44 FJ Garcia, ‘The Salmon Case: Evolution of Balancing Mechanisms for Non-Trade Values in WTO’ in GA 
Bermann and PC Mavroidis (eds), Trade and Human Health and Safety (CUP 2006) 149–50 (discussing this risk). 
45 See eg Panel Reports, Australia – Certain Measures concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and 
other Plain Packaging Requirements applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS435/R, 
WT/DS441/R, WT/DS458/R, WT/DS467/R, paras 7.514–17. Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Apples from New Zealand, WT/DS367/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2010, para 384. 
46 In addition to the case law discussed below, consider the obiter remark in Panel Report, European Communities 
– Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/R, adopted 23 October 2002, para 7.120 (‘Article 2.2 and this 
preambular text affirm that it is up to the Members to decide which policy objectives they wish to pursue and the 
levels at which they wish to pursue them’). 
47 TBT Agreement art 2.2. Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 13 June 2012, para 313. An earlier 
draft of Article 2.2 included a footnote stating that ‘This provision is intended to ensure proportionality between 
regulations and the risks non-fulfilment of legitimate objectives would create’, but this was not included in the 
final agreement: GATT Doc MTN.TNC/W/FA (20 December 1991) Page G.3. Arguably, this supports the view 
that the provision does not permit proportionality balancing stricto sensu: J Neumann and E Türk, ‘Necessity 
Revisited: Proportionality in World Trade Organization Law After Korea—Beef, EC—Asbestos and EC—
Sardines’ (2003) 37 JWT 199, 221. 




The TBT Agreement does not contain a closed list of legitimate objectives that may justify 
trade-restrictive measures. WTO adjudicators have held that they must make an independent 
assessment of whether a member’s technical regulation pursues a legitimate objective.49 Where 
the objective pursued by a technical regulation is among those listed in Article 2.2, no further 
inquiry is required into whether it qualifies as a legitimate objective.50 Where the objective 
pursued is not listed in Article 2.2, WTO adjudicators have considered whether the objective 
is ‘linked or related to a specific listed objective’, or supported by other parts of the TBT 
Agreement (specifically the sixth and seventh recitals of the preamble), or whether the 
legitimate objectives recognized by other WTO agreements provide guidance.51 As Andrew 
Mitchell and Caroline Henckels have argued, in situations where a treaty provision does not 
specify a closed list of legitimate objectives, an adjudicator’s role in relation to the question of 
whether a measure pursues a legitimate objective should be limited to filtering out ‘exercises 
of power … that cannot ever justify limiting protected rights and interests’, such as measures 
that pursue protectionist or discriminatory objectives.52 Beyond this, adjudicators would do 
well to accept that as a general matter ‘states may determine their own legitimate policy 
objectives’.53 It will be suggested below that the approach to this issue under the TBT 
Agreement is relevant to the investment treaty context because investment treaties typically do 
not contain a closed list of permissible policy objectives that may justify measures that restrict 
other treaty-protected interests. 
The necessity test in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement has been interpreted to require 
‘a relational analysis of the trade-restrictiveness of the technical regulation, the degree of 
contribution that it makes to the achievement of a legitimate objective, and the risks non-
fulfilment would create’. This usually requires a comparison with potential alternative 
measures that would be less trade restrictive but ‘make an equivalent contribution to the 
relevant legitimate objective’.54 Despite an initial panel interpretation to the contrary,55 it is 
now clear that the focus under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement is not on the level at which a 
member aimed to achieve a permissible objective. ‘Rather, what a panel is required to do, under 
Article 2.2, is to assess the degree to which a Member's technical regulation, as adopted, 
written, and applied, contributes to the legitimate objective pursued by that Member.’56 
In order to determine the degree of contribution achieved by a members’ technical 
regulation, a panel must consider ‘the design, structure, and operation of the technical 
regulation, as well as from evidence relating to the application of the measure’.57 The idea is 
that ‘a WTO Member, by preparing, adopting, and applying a measure in order to pursue a 
legitimate objective, articulates either implicitly or explicitly the level at which it seeks to 
pursue that particular legitimate objective’.58 Specifically, the level at which a member chooses 
to pursue a legitimate objective ‘is usually revealed by the degree of contribution that a 
technical regulation actually makes to its objective’, although it ‘may also be discernible … 
 
49 See eg Appellate Body Reports, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, 
WT/DS384/AB/R WT/DS386/AB/R, adopted 23 July 2012, paras 371, 395. Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna 
II (n 47) para 314. 
50 Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL (n 49) para 372. 
51 Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL (n 49) paras 370, 372, 444–5. 
52 Mitchell and Henckels (n 25) 99. C Henckels, Proportionality and Deference in Investor-State Arbitration: 
Balancing Investment Protection and Regulatory Autonomy (CUP 2015) 127–8. 
53 Mitchell and Henckels (n 25) 151. 
54 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (n 47) paras 318, 320–2. 
55 See Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes (n 24) para 7.370. 
56 Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL (n 49) para 390, affirmed in Panel Reports, Australia – Tobacco Plain 
Packaging (n 45) para 7.196. 
57 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (n 47) para 317.  




through an express provision or statement in the instrument at issue’.59 There is a parallel here 
with the approach seen above in the GATT/GATS context, where the level of protection 
pursued by a responding member is subject to objective determination, through reference to 
evidence concerning the structure and operation of a measure (ie, the degree to which it actually 
achieves a particular objective) and other contextual evidence.60  
Within the broader necessity test under Article 2.2, any proposed alternative measure 
must achieve an ‘an equivalent degree of contribution to the relevant legitimate objective’.61 
The AB has held that the phrase ‘taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create’ in 
Article 2.2 cannot lessen the degree of contribution needed for an alternative measure to qualify 
as equivalent, as this could ‘erode the principle that a member shall not be prevented from 
pursuing a legitimate objective “at the levels it considers appropriate”’.62 Furthermore, the AB 
has rejected the argument that the phrase ‘taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would 
create’ provides a ‘basis for taking into account the relative importance of the objective pursued 
… compared to the importance of other objectives’.63 These statements highlight how the 
necessity test under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement has been interpreted so as to preserve 
WTO members’ ability to choose which regulatory aims to pursue and the level at which to 
pursue permissible aims.  
Ultimately, in the context of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, the focus is on the 
degree of contribution to the relevant regulatory objective which is actually made by the 
impugned measures. In contrast, a test utilizing the benchmark of the level of protection 
intended by a regulator ex ante is more deferential to a regulating State as it allows the State to 
pronounce the desired level of protection and does not reduce that level based on the 
effectiveness of the measures adopted to achieve it. As will be seen next, such a test is mandated 
under the SPS Agreement. 
 
C. SPS Agreement 
 
The concept of the appropriate level of protection (ALOP) ‘runs throughout’ the SPS 
Agreement.64 As noted above, the term is defined as ‘[t]he level of protection deemed 
appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health within its territory’.65 The concern that the disciplines imposed by 
the SPS Agreement should not require ‘[m]embers to change their appropriate level of 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health’ is apparent in the Agreement’s preamble, 
 
59 Appellate Body Reports, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements – 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and Mexico, WT/DS384/AB/RW WT/DS386/AB/RW, adopted 
29 May 2015, para 5.201 and fn 632 (emphasis in original). 
60 See above text at n 43. 
61 US – COOL (Article 21.5) (n 59) para 5.201 (emphasis in original). 
62 ibid paras 5.264–6. However, the AB has accepted that ‘the nature of the risks and the gravity of the 
consequences arising from the non-fulfilment of the technical regulation's objective’, can inform the margin of 
appreciation enjoyed by a panel in assessing whether a proposed alternative measure would achieve an equivalent 
degree of contribution to the relevant objective: ibid paras 5.215, 5.217–18, 5.254, 5.269. See also Appellate Body 
Report, US – Tuna II (n 47) paras 321–2. These statements appear to suggest that where the risks of non-fulfilment 
of the relevant objective are grave, it will be more difficult to establish that a proposed alternative would make an 
equivalent degree of contribution. For a similar interpretation see Mitchell and Henckels (n 25) 144. Contrast C 
Downes, ‘Worth Shopping Around? Defending Regulatory Autonomy under the SPS and TBT Agreements’ 
(2015) 14 WTR 553, 567–72 (suggesting this aspect of Article 2.2 may provide a basis for proportionality 
balancing stricto sensu). A Desmedt, ‘Proportionality in WTO Law’ (2001) 4 JIEL 441, 459–60 (similar). 
63 US – COOL (Article 21.5) (n 59) paras 5.277, 5.279.  
64 Atik (n 21) 116. 




and several of the specific obligations imposed.66 As Atik observes, ‘the operative presumption 
of the SPS Agreement is national autonomy in setting health and food safety targets … 
[however] the SPS Agreement meaningfully cabins these respective autonomies: not all is 
permitted’.67 For the purposes of this article, the necessity test imposed under Article 5.6 is 
particularly relevant, which requires that members’ sanitary or phytosanitary (SPS) measures 
‘are not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of … protection, 
taking into account technical and economic feasibility’.68 A footnote clarifies that: ‘a measure 
is not more trade-restrictive than required unless there is another measure, reasonably available 
taking into account technical and economic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level of 
… protection and is significantly less restrictive to trade’.69 As others have noted, the language 
of Article 5.6 and the associated footnote is arguably more ‘protective of domestic regulatory 
autonomy compared to the necessary test in GATT Article XX’, because it is explicitly stated 
that any alternative measure must achieve the member’s selected level of protection.70 
Accordingly, any lowering of the regulatory objective, through a balancing exercise that 
considers factors such as a measure’s trade restrictiveness, the measure’s contribution to the 
relevant regulatory objective or the relative importance of the aim, is explicitly prohibited.71 
Within Article 5.6 jurisprudence, WTO adjudicators have held that determining the 
appropriate level of protection ‘is a prerogative’ of the member concerned.72 The idea is that 
the level of protection selected by a member ‘is an objective’ determined ex ante, whereas an 
SPS measure ‘is an instrument chosen to attain or implement that objective’.73 At this point, it 
is helpful to emphasize a key difference between the necessity test under the SPS Agreement, 
and the necessity tests under other WTO agreements, considered above. Specifically, as Yury 
Rovnov has noted:  
it is only the SPS Agreement that establishes a separate metric (ALOP) for the different 
levels (degrees) of achievement of such a policy objective (in this case, protection 
against SPS risks) and gauges the legality of the covered measures by reference to that 
metric – which is taken to exist independently of the challenged measure – rather than 
to the measure itself.74 
In contrast, as we saw above in relation to the GATT/GATS and TBT necessity jurisprudence, 
those agreements do not contain a textual basis for a benchmark, such as the ALOP, that is 
separate from the measure itself. Instead, as we have seen, the concept of the ‘level of 
protection’ in those contexts is generally understood as the degree to which the relevant 
measure, as implemented, contributes to the relevant policy aim. In short, in those contexts, it 
is the level of protection achieved by a measure that serves as the benchmark for necessity, or 
least restrictive means, testing. Given this difference, the obligation to determine the 
 
66 eg ibid Preamble, arts 3.3, 4.1, 5.6. 
67 Atik (n 21) 118. 
68 SPS Agreement Art 5.6. Another key discipline on SPS measures is that they must be based on a risk assessment 
that takes account of available scientific evidence: SPS Agreement arts 5.1–5.2. Potentially, this requirement can 
also curtail a member’s ability to pursue a particular level of protection. Note that SPS measures that conform to 
international standards are presumed to be consistent with the SPS Agreement and the GATT: SPS Agreement art 
3.2. 
69 SPS Agreement art 5.6, fn 3. 
70 Du (n 32) 845.  
71 ibid. J Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: A Commentary (OUP 2009) 159–
61. 
72 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 
November 1998, para 199 (emphasis in original). 
73 ibid para 200 (emphasis in original). 





appropriate level of protection, to enable the application of the disciplines of the SPS 
Agreement,75 is best understood as specific to the SPS context. 
Ordinarily, a panel adjudicating a claim under Article 5.6 is ‘expected to accord weight 
to the respondent's articulation of its appropriate level of protection’, particularly where it ‘was 
specified in advance of the adoption of the SPS measure, … with sufficient precision, and 
where it has been consistently expressed by the responding Member’.76 However, similar to 
what has been seen above in relation to other WTO agreements, in the SPS context a panel 
does not have to completely defer to the respondent’s characterization of its appropriate level 
of protection and must determine this on the basis of the totality of the record.77 Additionally, 
where a member has not determined its appropriate level of protection, or has not done so with 
sufficient precision, the AB has accepted that the appropriate level of protection can be inferred 
‘on the basis of the level of protection reflected in the SPS measure actually applied’.78  To 
succeed with claim under Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, a complainant has to advance 
scientific evidence to establish a prima facie case that its proposed alternative measure would 
meet the regulating member’s selected level of protection.79 For cases where a member has 
determined its level of protection with sufficient clarity prior to adopting an SPS measure, the 
benchmark that proposed alternative measures must meet is the level of protection selected by 
the member, not that achieved by its measure.80 
Rovnov has highlighted that in practice both WTO panels, and WTO members 
themselves, have expressed the chosen ALOP in broad and imprecise qualitative formulations, 
which are similar across SPS disputes (eg a ‘high’ or ‘very high’ level of protection).81 
Schebesta and Sinopoli similarly note that in many SPS disputes the ALOP is only defined in 
vague terms and has to be induced, at least partly, from the SPS measure applied.82 In short, 
the experience in the SPS case law has been that the ALOP is an imprecise concept, and 
members often refrain from clearly articulating their selected ALOP, despite the obligation to 
do so.83 While it is important to acknowledge these difficulties with the ALOP concept, they 
would not necessarily arise in the same way, or to the same extent, in the investment treaty 
context. This is because, unlike the SPS Agreement, investment treaties do not create a 
benchmark of the ALOP that is separate from the challenged measure(s), nor impose an 
obligation on States to determine ex ante the level of protection that is desired. Accordingly, in 
the investment treaty context, similar to the GATT/GATS and TBT case law considered above, 
the focus should be on the level of protection, or degree of contribution to the relevant aim, 
achieved by the impugned measure(s), which would serve as the benchmark that proposed 
alternative measures must meet. While this does not remove the difficulties, discussed above, 
around pinpointing the level of protection that a measure, as implemented, achieves,84 it 
 
75 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon (n 72) paras 205–7. 
76 Appellate Body Report, India – Measures Concerning the Importation of Certain Agricultural Products, 
WT/DS430/AB/R, adopted 19 June 2015, para 5.221. 
77 ibid. 
78 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon (n 72) para 207. 
79 See Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples (n 45) paras 364–6. 
80 See Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon (n 72) paras 200–4; Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples 
(n 45) para 344.  
81 Rovnov (n 74) 1360–5. 
82 H Schebesta and D Sinopoli, ‘The Potency of the SPS Agreement’s Excessivity Test: The Impact of Article 5.6 
on Trade Liberalization and the Regulatory Power of WTO Members to Take Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures’ (2018) 21 JIEL 123, 135–7. 
83 See also L Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and Environmental Risks under WTO Law: A Critical Analysis of 
the SPS Agreement (OUP 2010) 249–50 (noting the unsatisfactory results that emerge from the SPS Agreement 
using a benchmark, the ALOP, that is separate from the level of protection reflected in the impugned measure). 




suggests that the difficulties arising in the SPS context, with its focus on the ALOP as a 
benchmark separate from the measure itself, are distinct. 
 
D. Summarizing the Lessons from WTO Law 
 
This analysis of the level of protection in WTO law offers several lessons for how the ability 
of States to select and implement a particular level of protection for permissible regulatory 
aims could be better protected in the investment treaty regime. Above all, WTO members’ 
autonomy in deciding the level at which to pursue permissible regulatory aims has informed 
how key WTO disciplines and exceptions have been interpreted and applied. Contextual 
interpretation has played a key role in this regard.85 A good example is the frequent reference 
to the sixth recital in the preamble of the TBT Agreement when interpreting the necessity test 
under Article 2.2 of that Agreement. In investment law, where the relevant treaties generally 
do not specify a limited range of permissible regulatory objectives, and, as will be shown, there 
is a growing body of treaty provisions aimed at safeguarding regulatory autonomy, the starting 
point should also be substantial deference towards a State’s own choice of which regulatory 
objectives to pursue, and the level at which to pursue those aims.86  
Importantly, host State autonomy in selecting regulatory aims, including a particular 
level of protection, also needs to inform the interpretation of key treaty disciplines.87 In this 
regard, WTO necessity jurisprudence, analyzed above, offers certain insights, because it has 
avoided undermining members’ choice of regulatory aims, while still placing meaningful 
restrictions on the means selected to achieve those objectives.88 As has been seen, WTO 
necessity jurisprudence employs a least restrictive means test, and has avoided engaging in 
proportionality balancing stricto sensu, whereby the regulatory goal pursued by a member 
could be directly weighed against, and downgraded in light of, the competing treaty-protected 
interest of trade liberalization. In this respect, the requirement that any proposed alternative 
measure must make an equivalent contribution to the relevant regulatory aim is a crucial feature 
of the necessity jurisprudence.  
Nevertheless, significant constraints are placed on how members may pursue their 
chosen regulatory aims. As seen above, WTO provisions frequently require that members use 
the least trade restrictive means reasonably available.89 Other related provisions, which have 
not been the focus of this article, require that the measures themselves, or they manner in which 
they are applied, are non-discriminatory.90 Through these features, WTO law endorses a 
hierarchy of values, whereby non-trade regulatory aims recognized as legitimate within a 
 
85 CE Foster, Global Regulatory Standards in Environmental and Health Disputes: Regulatory Coherence, Due 
Regard and Due Diligence (forthcoming OUP 2021) 150–1, 172–3 (suggesting WTO necessity jurisprudence 
reflects the principles of effectiveness and contextual interpretation). I Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the 
WTO Appellate Body (OUP 2009) 298–9 (suggesting the AB’s necessity jurisprudence reflects systemic values 
that govern all WTO treaty language, including preserving sufficient policy space for members). 
86 See above text at n 52–3. 
87 See also J Arato, K Claussen and JB Heath, ‘The Perils of Pandemic Exceptionalism’ (2020) 114 AJIL 627, 
635 (advocating incorporating flexibilities within primary obligations). 
88 See also Mitchell and Henckels (n 25) 146–7, 151, 153–7 (identifying lessons that investment tribunals can 
draw from WTO necessity jurisprudence). 
89 TBT Agreement art 2.2 and SPS Agreement art 5.6 explicitly refer to trade restrictiveness. In the context of 
GATT art XX and GATS art XIV, the case law has developed the benchmark of utilizing the least trade restrictive 
means reasonably available. Earlier case law at times referred to the idea of the ‘least degree of inconsistency’ 
with other treaty obligations: see eg Mitchell and Henckels (n 21) 131–2. As they note, later case law has indicated 
that the focus in assessing trade-restrictiveness is on ‘the factual impact of the measure on the underlying values 
that the infringed obligation is designed to protect’: ibid. See Appellate Body Report, China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products (n 33) para 306. 




particular covered agreement can take priority over the interest of trade liberalization, so long 
as the specified conditions for pursuing such non-trade aims are complied with.91  
In the next Part it will be demonstrated that there is already a significant textual basis 
in newer investment treaties for the proposition that the treaty parties retain the right to 
determine which regulatory objectives to pursue and the level at which to pursue permissible 
aims. The challenge is mostly one of better integrating this idea into the interpretation and 
application of investment protection standards. It is suggested that the requirement to construe 
investment protection obligations in their full context, having regard to the competing interest 
of regulatory autonomy, can be taken significantly further yet. In particular, investment treaties 
and jurisprudence could be reoriented towards a similar balance to that seen in the WTO 
context, whereby so long as a State pursues a permissible regulatory aim, and uses the means 
to achieve that aim that involve the least possible restriction of the competing interests 
protected by relevant investment treaty obligations, a treaty breach should not be found.92  
At this point, it can simply be noted that this is not the orientation that always been 
adopted, even in recent treaties or arbitral awards. Rather, as will be shown, within the key 
standards of FET and the protection against indirect expropriation, both adjudicators and treaty 
drafters have laid a clear basis for proportionality balancing stricto sensu, which could involve 
prioritizing the interest of investment protection over the regulatory aim pursued by a State, 
even where the least restrictive means has been utilized. A core claim of the following parts is 
that this opening for proportionality balancing stricto sensu must be reconsidered, if investment 
treaties are to be construed in a manner that respects State autonomy to determine the level at 
which to pursue permissible regulatory aims. 
 
IV. INVESTMENT TREATIES ARE CONSISTENT WITH STATE AUTONOMY IN 
SETTING THE LEVEL OF PROTECTION FOR PERMISSIBLE REGULATORY AIMS 
 
This Part argues that investment treaties are, properly interpreted, consistent with the idea that 
States retain autonomy to determine the level at which to pursue permissible regulatory aims. 
While investment treaties constrain the means through which States may pursue their selected 
policy aims, it will be suggested that they are largely not concerned with limiting what those 
policy goals may be. Although only a subset of the provisions considered in this Part explicitly 
address the treaty parties’ autonomy to determine the level of protection for certain permissible 
regulatory aims (eg environmental or labour protection), collectively the effect of the 
provisions considered is significant. The provisions discussed signal to adjudicators that 
investment protection is not the only concern of investment treaties, and at times evidence an 
intention to give priority to competing regulatory aims.93 The provisions analyzed in this Part 
provide a textual hook through which investment adjudicators could give greater effect to host 
State autonomy in pursuing a desired level of protection for permissible regulatory aims. 
Accordingly, while this claim concerning States’ autonomy to determine the level of protection 
 
91 eg P Van den Bossche and W Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Texts, Cases and 
Materials (4th ed, CUP 2017) 545–6.  
92 In applying a least restrictive means test there is a question of whether the focus should be on the effect of an 
impugned measure on an individual complainant investor, or on the degree to which the measure restricts the 
competing values protected by applicable legal norms, viewed in a wider perspective. See eg EM Leonhardsen, 
‘Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring Proportionality Analysis in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2012) 3 JIDS 95, 
114, drawing on DH Regan, ‘The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (1986) 84 Michigan Law Review 1091, 1101–7. As Caroline Foster has argued, if one takes 
the view that investment treaties ultimately remain inter-State bargains, despite the procedural rights conferred on 
investors, then the focus should be on the impact of a measure on the interest of investment protection, as enshrined 
in applicable treaty provisions, rather than the burden falling on an individual complainant: Foster (n 85) 259–61. 




amounts to an extension of existing trends, it has a significant basis in existing investment 
treaties and case law. This Part has three subsections: first, it considers several different 
categories of investment treaty provisions that provide textual support for this claim, before 
considering arbitral interpretations that have recognized the autonomy retained by States to 
determine which regulatory aims to pursue. Finally, it is explained why this argument holds 
even in relation to older investment treaties, which do not contain textual references to a wider 
range of non-economic interests. 
 
A. Investment Treaty Provisions Supporting State Autonomy to Determine Regulatory 
Aims, including Levels of Protection 
 
One category of provisions that are directly relevant to the claim being made concerning States’ 
autonomy to determine the level of protection are provisions which affirm that the treaty 
parties, despite undertaking investment protection obligations, retain the right to regulate. Such 
a provision first appeared in Article 1114(1) of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), which provides: ‘Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from 
adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it 
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner 
sensitive to environmental concerns.’94 Similar provisions have been routinely used by a range 
of States over the last fifteen years.95  
Increasingly, right to regulate provisions extend beyond the environmental regulation 
of investment activity to cover a non-exhaustive list of legitimate regulatory objectives.96 Due 
to the ‘otherwise consistent’ qualification, such provisions have widely been viewed as ‘self-
cancelling’,97 although some commentators have advanced alternative interpretations.98 
However, an analogy can be drawn with the sixth preambular recital to the TBT Agreement, 
considered above, which is also prefaced by a qualification of measures that are ‘otherwise in 
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement’, but which has been interpreted as providing 
context that has shaped how the disciplines contained in that Agreement are construed.99 
Furthermore, recent case law interpreting right to regulate provisions suggests that even 
provisions including the ‘otherwise consistent’ qualifier can have a significant effect on how 
investment treaties are construed, essentially by serving as interpretative context that 
underscores the margin of appreciation to be afforded to State measures pursuing permissible 
regulatory aims.100 
 
94 NAFTA (1992) art 1114(1). 
95 From many, eg Mexico–Chile FTA (1998) art 9-15(1); Singapore–United States FTA (2003) art 15.10; Korea–
Peru FTA (2010) art 9.9; Morocco–Nigeria BIT (2016) art 13(4).  
96 eg Indonesia–Australia CEPA (2019) art 14.16; CETA art 8.9(1). United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement 
(USMCA) (2018) art 14.16. 
97 eg L Johnson, L Sachs and N Lobel, ‘Aligning International Investment Agreements with the Sustainable 
Development Goals’ (2019) 58 ColumJTransnat’l L 58, 101. C Martini, ‘Balancing Investors’ Rights with 
Environmental Protection in International Investment Arbitration: An Assessment of Recent Trends in Investment 
Treaty Drafting’ (2017) 50 The International Lawyer 529, 568. 
98 See JW Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (2nd edn, OUP 2015) 385 (suggesting that ‘The phrase 
“otherwise consistent with the Treaty” would seem to mean that the measures in question would be consistent but 
for the fact that they were taken to assure that investments will be conducted in an environmentally sensitive 
manner’). 
99 Mitchell, Sheargold and Voon (n 1) 159. Consider also article 8.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, which requires that the relevant measures are ‘consistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement’, and has been held to provide interpretative context that informs the construction of other 
provisions of the Agreement: Panel Reports, Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging (n 45) paras 7.2401–8. 
100 Aven v Costa Rica (n 16) paras 412–13, 743. Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v Sultanate of Oman, ICSID Case No 




A particular form of right to regulate provisions is found in the recent Model BITs of 
the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU), Canada, Colombia, the Netherlands and 
the Slovak Republic, and recent investment treaties concluded by the EU, Colombia, Hungary 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). With some variations, these clauses clarify that the 
provisions of the relevant agreement do not affect the right of the parties to regulate through 
measures to achieve a range of legitimate policy objectives, and omit the ‘otherwise consistent’ 
qualifier.101 Such provisions still do not provide an unambiguous basis for the parties to adopt 
measures inconsistent with other obligations contained in the relevant treaties, and are most 
likely to serve as interpretative context that would inform the construction of investment 
protection obligations.102 Nevertheless, by omitting the ‘otherwise consistent’ qualification, 
such provisions provide an even stronger basis for the claim that investment treaties, although 
constraining the means though which regulatory aims may be pursued, are intended to leave 
States with wide discretion to determine which aims to pursue, including selecting a particular 
level of protection for permissible aims. 
Another element of contemporary investment treaties that supports this claim is the 
common preambular language concerning regulatory autonomy and levels of protection. For 
example, preambular language often reaffirms the treaty parties’ right to regulate,103 or records 
the parties’ intention to reconcile trade and investment policies with high levels of 
environmental protection,104 or the parties’ agreement that the economic development 
objectives of the treaty can be achieved without relaxing health, safety, or environmental 
standards.105 Such language suggests that the object and purpose of the treaty is to preserve, 
rather than to undermine, the parties’ right to regulate.106 Ultimately, preambular language 
 
No ARB/14/5, Award (3 June 2021) paras 772–81. In SD Myers, Arbitrator Schwartz rejected the argument that 
that due to the ‘otherwise consistent’ qualification, Article 1114 of NAFTA was merely ‘empty rhetoric’; rather 
the provision served to remind interpreters of NAFTA’s investment chapter that ‘the parties take both the 
environment and open trade very seriously and that means should be found to reconcile these two objectives’: SD 
Myers, Inc v Canada, UNCITRAL, Separate Opinion of Dr Bryan Schwartz (12 November 2000) para 118. Article 
1114 of NAFTA was also considered in passing in Metalclad Corp v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/1, 
Award (30 August 2000) para 98. 
101 CETA art 8.9(1). EU–Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement (IPA) (2019) art 2.2(1). EU–Singapore IPA 
(2018) art 2.2(1). EU–Mexico Global Agreement (2020) ch 17, art 1. Rwanda–UAE BIT (2017) art 9(1); 
Colombia–UAE BIT (2017) art 10(1); Argentina–UAE BIT (2018) art 11. Brazil–UAE BIT (2019) art 17(1); 
Ethiopia–UAE BIT (2016) art 18(1). Colombia Model BIT (2017) ‘Chapeau on Investment and Regulatory 
Measures’. BLEU Model BIT (2019) art 1(2). Canada Model FIPA (2021) art 3. Slovak Republic Model BIT 
(2019) art 4(1). The following agreements add the nexus ‘necessary’: Argentina–Qatar BIT (2016) art 10; 
Netherlands Model BIT (2019) art 2(2); Hungary–Cabo Verde BIT (2019) art 3(1); Hungary–Belarus BIT (2019) 
art 3(1). Hungary–Kyrgyzstan BIT (2020) art 3(1). Some of Colombia’s investment treaties require that ‘such 
measures are proportional to the objectives sought’: eg Colombia–Turkey BIT (2014) art 11(1). Colombia–UK 
BIT (2010) art VIII. 
102 C Titi, ‘The Right to Regulate’ in MM Mbengue and S Schacherer (eds), Foreign Investment Under the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) (Springer 2019) 170–1 (suggesting the relevant 
provision in CETA ‘serves as an interpretive statement … it does not appear to provide a concrete actionable 
right’). Johnson, Sachs and Lobel (n 97) 101 (suggesting the effect of provisions without the ‘otherwise consistent’ 
qualifier remain ambiguous). 
103 eg Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) (2018) preamble; CETA 
preamble; USMCA preamble; Netherlands Model BIT (2019) preamble. BLEU Model BIT (2019) preamble. 
104 eg CPTPP preamble; USMCA preamble; EU–Singapore IPA (2018) preamble. 
105 eg Japan–Korea–China Trilateral Investment Agreement (2012) preamble. Switzerland–Egypt BIT (2010) 
preamble. US–Jordan BIT (1997) preamble. For additional typology of preambular language see eg Martini (n 
97) 560–3. 
106 S Schacherer, ‘The CETA Investment Chapter and Sustainable Development: Interpretative Issues’ in MM 
Mbengue and S Schacherer (eds), Foreign Investment Under the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) (Springer 2019) 227 (making a similar point in relation to the joint interpretative instrument concluded 




serves as interpretative context that may influence how other treaty obligations (eg investment 
protection standards) are construed.107  
A related and increasingly common feature of investment treaties that provides 
significant textual support for the claim being made are provisions recognizing the treaty 
parties’ right to determine and implement their own levels of environmental or labour 
protection.108 Such provisions have been routinely included in the environment or sustainable 
development chapters or side agreements of FTAs since NAFTA, including those concluded 
by the United States109 and the European Union.110 Numerous BITs concluded by the BLEU 
from 2004 onwards contain provisions that recognize ‘the right of each Contracting Party to 
establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental development 
policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental legislation’.111 
While the drafting intention appears to be that such provisions would only be subject to 
consultations between the treaty parties,112 such provisions would provide interpretative 
context when interpreting and applying the investment protection obligations contained in the 
relevant treaties.113  
The equivalent provision in the 2019 Model BIT of the BLEU, which may serve as a 
basis for renegotiating its significant stock of investment treaties, contains notably stronger 
wording. This provision, entitled ‘Right to Regulate and Levels of Protection’, states:  
Nothing in this Agreement shall in any way be construed as limiting the right of a 
Contracting Party or any of their competent authorities to determine its sustainable 
development policies and priorities, to establish its own levels of domestic 
environmental and labour protection, and to adopt or modify its relevant laws and 
policies accordingly, consistently with the internationally recognised standards and 
agreements.114 
The language here moves closer to constituting a true exception or defence (‘Nothing in this 
Agreement shall in any way be construed as limiting’) rather than necessarily being limited to 
providing interpretative context.115 Consistently with this characterization, the provision is 
qualified by the fact that it only covers conduct consistent ‘with the internationally recognised 
standards and agreements’, and the Parties ‘shall not apply labour and environmental domestic 
laws in a manner that would constitute a disguised restriction of investment or an unjustified 
discrimination’.116 For present purposes, the key point is that this category of provisions 
 
107 Titi (n 102) 169. Martini (n 97) 563–7. 
108 eg EU–China CAI section IV(2), Art 1 and section IV(3) Art 1. Ethiopia–UAE BIT (2016) art 12(1); CPTPP 
Art 20.3(2); Slovakia–UAE BIT (2016) art 12(2); Iran–Slovakia BIT (2016) art 10(2). A similar provision appears 
in the EU’s text proposal within the ongoing negotiations to modernize the Energy Charter Treaty, entitled 
‘Sustainable development - Right to regulate and levels of protection’ 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/may/tradoc_158754.pdf>. 
109 eg North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (1993) art 3; DR–CAFTA (2004) art 17.1; 
Singapore–US FTA (2004) art 18.1 Jordan–US FTA (2000) art 5(2). 
110 eg EU–South Korea FTA (2011) art 13.3. CETA arts 23.2, 24.3.  
111 eg UAE–BLEU BIT (2004) art 5(1); BLEU–Mauritius BIT (2005) art 5(1); BLEU–Qatar BIT (2007) art 5(1). 
112 Typically, the relevant provision specifies that it is subject to consultations between the Parties, but it is not 
explicitly removed from investor-State or State–State dispute settlement: eg UAE–BLEU BIT (2004) arts 5(3), 
12–13. In some agreements, any obligations arising from the provision are explicitly removed from the treaty’s 
dispute settlement mechanisms: eg BLEU–Colombia BIT (2009) art VII(5). 
113 T Gazzini, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and Sustainable Development’ (2014) 15 JWIT 929, 952.  
114 BLEU Model BIT (2019) art 15(1). The provision is excluded from the investor-State dispute settlement 
mechanism under the model treaty, but would be relevant as interpretative context, and could be subject to inter-
State dispute settlement: arts 19(1), 23(1)–(3). 
115 For discussion of the typical structure of exceptions and defences see eg C Henckels, ‘Should Investment 
Treaties Contain Public Policy Exceptions?’ (2018) 59 B.C.L. Rev. 2825, 2827–9. 




provides a textual basis for the claim that investment treaties are intended to preserve the treaty 
parties’ right to determine which policy aims to pursue, including the right to select and 
implement a specific level of protection for permissible aims, such as environmental or labour 
protection. While such provisions are currently only found in a relatively small number of 
investment treaties, it is conceivable that future investment treaties, or a future statute of a 
multilateral investment court, could provide that the treaty preserves the parties’ right to 
determine their own level of protection for permissible regulatory aims.117 
Another aspect of recent investment treaties that is supportive of the claim being made 
is that there is little sign of States using investment treaties to require parties to implement the 
same level of protection for permissible regulatory aims. Rather, while newer treaties contain 
an increasing number of references to sustainable development issues, such provisions are 
largely focused on preserving domestic regulatory autonomy,118 although they do impose some 
outer limits on the parties’ right to regulate in certain areas (typically environmental and labour 
protection).119  
For example, so-called non-regression provisions, whereby the treaty parties recognize 
that it is inappropriate to lower the level of protection provided by their environmental or labour 
laws in order encourage trade or investment,120 at most prevent a State regressing from its 
current level of protection, but only for the purposes outlined.121 Accordingly, such provisions 
are reconcilable with the above-mentioned common provision recognizing each party’s right 
to determine its own level of environmental or labour protection.122  
Other provisions that impose an obligation on the treaty parties to pursue high levels of 
environmental protection, or to strive to improve their existing levels of protection, often 
include hortatory or imprecise language, which weakens the obligation.123 Even where such 
provisions are more definitive, they simply require the treaty parties to ensure that their laws 
provide for high levels of environmental and labour protection, rather than requiring all treaty 
parties to adopt the same level of protection, or the same laws and policies.124  
Finally, right to regulate provisions that qualify the Parties’ right to set their own level 
of protection, by stating that this right must be exercised in a manner consistent with a Party’s 
multilateral environmental or labour commitments,125 do not represent an agenda of 
 
117 For suggestions on this point see F Ortino, ‘Taming the Chaos in Investment Treaty Protection’ (2020) 
Columbia FDI Perspectives No 294. Titi (n 5) 535. 
118 W Kidane, ‘Sustainable Development Obligations and Access to Treaty Remedies in Contemporary Investment 
Treaties and Models’ in JE Kalicki and M Abdel Raouf (eds), Evolution and Adaptation: The Future of 
International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2019) 297, 303. 
119 G Marín Durán, ‘Sustainable Development Chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements: Emerging Compliance 
Issues’ (2020) 57 CML Rev 1031, 1036–40 (suggesting the various categories of obligations, discussed in this 
paragraph, can be interpreted as imposing distinct limitations on the sovereign right to regulate in environmental 
or labour matters). 
120 eg EU–China CAI section IV(2) art 2(2), section IV(3) art 2(2). CETA arts 23.4(1), 24.5(1). BLEU Model BIT 
(2019) art 15(3). Netherlands Model BIT (2019) art 6(4). 
121 Some argue that there is a difference, in terms of the mandatory nature of the obligation, between those treaties 
where the parties merely recognize it is inappropriate to lower their levels of protection to attract trade or 
investment, and those treaties where the parties agree not to do so: eg B Melo Araujo, ‘Labour Provisions in EU 
and US Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: Rhetoric and Reality’ (2018) 67 ICLQ 233, 249. For examples of the 
latter type of provision see eg CARIFORUM–EU EPA (2008) arts 188(1)(a) and 193(a); UK–EFTA FTA (2021) 
art 13.4(1). 
122 Mitchell and Munro (n 42) 688–90. 
123 eg CETA art 24.3 (obligation to ‘seek to ensure’), CPTPP art 20.3(3) (‘strive to ensure’); Iran–Slovakia BIT 
art 10(2) (obligation to ensure ‘appropriate levels of environmental protection’); Japan–India CEPA art 8.1 
(‘adequate levels of environmental protection’). 
124 eg Netherlands Model BIT (2019) art 6(2). BLEU Model BIT (2019) art 15(2). DR–CAFTA art 17.1. 




harmonization, because the referenced multilateral commitments generally leave States with 
substantial discretion concerning their domestic standards.126  
In summary, the provisions analyzed in the preceding three paragraphs do not evidence 
an intention to require treaty parties to adopt the same levels of environmental or labour 
protection, or the same laws and policies, although they do place some outer limits on States’ 
right to regulate in these areas. 
Finally, the increasingly widespread use of WTO-style general exceptions provisions 
in investment treaties127 also provides some support for the argument that investment treaties 
should be interpreted as preserving a State’s ability to determine its own level of protection for 
permissible regulatory aims. The significance of general exceptions provisions is that they 
either remove regulatory conduct falling within the provision from the scope of the treaty 
obligations or immunize otherwise treaty-inconsistent conduct.128 Accordingly, they can be 
understood as an attempt by States to preserve their ability to pursue a range of recognized 
legitimate policy aims, despite having undertaken investment treaty obligations that constrain 
the means through which such aims may be pursued.  
Furthermore, as seen in Part III, WTO necessity jurisprudence under GATT Article 
XX/GATS Article XIV has for twenty years explicitly recognized that WTO members retain 
the prerogative to set the desired level of protection for permissible regulatory aims.129 
Accordingly, an argument can be made that States, by including in their investment treaties 
exceptions modelled on GATT Article XX/GATS Article XIV, intend to transpose this aspect 
of regulatory autonomy into the investment treaty context.130 In sum, there is a case for 
interpreting WTO-style general exceptions provisions in investment treaties in light of WTO 
necessity jurisprudence, including the case law’s emphasis on preserving States’ ability to 
determine the desired level of protection for permissible regulatory aims.131 This subsection 
has demonstrated why the overall claim being made concerning States’ autonomy to determine 
the level of protection for permissible regulatory aims is the correct approach when interpreting 
more recent investment treaties. 
 
 
126 M Bronckers and G Gruni, ‘Retooling the Sustainability Standards in EU Free Trade Agreements’ (2021) 24 
JIEL 25, 32. Panel of Experts Constituted under Article 13.15 of the EU–Korea Free Trade Agreement, Report of 
the Panel of Experts (20 January 2021) paras 80–4 (finding that an obligation to respect fundamental principles 
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and did not require harmonization of labour standards). 
127 See eg A Keene, ‘The Incorporation and Interpretation of WTO-Style Environmental Exceptions in 
International Investment Agreements’ (2017) 18 JWIT 62, 65 (finding in a sample of all publicly available 
investment treaties concluded between 2010–15, 45% of agreements included a WTO-style general exceptions 
provision). 
128 On this question see C Henckels, ‘Permission to Act: The Legal Character of General and Security Exceptions 
in International Trade and Investment Law’ (2020) 69 ICLQ 557. 
129 AD Mitchell, J Munro and T Voon, ‘Importing WTO General Exceptions into International Investment 
Agreements: Proportionality, Myths and Risks’ in L Sachs, L Johnson and J Coleman (eds) Yearbook on 
International Investment Law and Policy 2017 (OUP 2019) 329–31 (‘the defining feature of the necessity test in 
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general exceptions’). Consider also UAE–Israel BIT (2020), which includes a general exceptions provision largely 
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B. Investor-State Case Law Supporting State Autonomy to Determine Regulatory Aims, 
including Levels of Protection  
 
This subsection addresses case law that provides varying degrees of support for this claim. In 
short, as in the WTO context, investment law adjudicators have often recognized that 
investment treaties discipline the means employed by States, while leaving States largely free 
to determine regulatory ends. 
SD Myers v Canada is an influential early award that provides direct support for this 
proposition. In this case, having regard to the preamble of NAFTA, and the environmental side 
agreement to NAFTA, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, the 
Tribunal held that ‘specific provisions of the NAFTA should be interpreted in light of’ several 
principles. These principles included that: ‘Parties have the right to establish high levels of 
environmental protection. They are not obliged to compromise their standards merely to satisfy 
the political or economic interests of other states’, and that ‘where a state can achieve its chosen 
level of environmental protection through a variety of equally effective and reasonable means, 
it is obliged to adopt the alternative that is most consistent with open trade’.132 These principles 
informed the Tribunal’s finding regarding a breach of the national treatment standard: while 
Canada’s aim of maintaining domestic facilities for processing certain kinds of hazardous 
waste was permissible, there were other means, consistent with NAFTA, for achieving this 
goal.133 In a separate opinion, Arbitrator Schwartz further observed that ‘dispute settling bodies 
have found that states are free to set high standards. A dispute settling body has no authority to 
hold public safety and welfare measures invalid merely because they strike that body as being 
unreasonably demanding’, and a breach would require a finding that a Party had a less 
restrictive means reasonably available to achieve its chosen level of protection.134  
Bilcon v Canada is a controversial award that highlights that while the parties to 
investment treaties retain wide discretion in selecting regulatory objectives, investment treaties 
impose substantial constrains on how States may pursue their chosen aims. The majority 
concluded that a domestic environmental review panel had fundamentally departed from its 
mandate under Canadian law when assessing and denying environmental approval for the 
investor’s project, and in doing so breached the international minimum standard, as well as the 
national treatment standard.135 Notably, despite this finding, it stressed that ‘NAFTA parties 
can set environmental standards as demanding and broad as they wish’. In justifying this 
conclusion, the Tribunal highlighted the reference in NAFTA’s Preamble to the Parties’ desire 
to ‘strengthen the development and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations’ and 
‘promote sustainable development’.136  
Muszynianka spółka z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością v Slovak Republic is a recent 
Award that highlights the extent to which investment treaties leave States’ free to pursue a wide 
range of policy aims, despite imposing restrictions on the means that may be used. Notably, 
this was a case decided under the Poland–Slovak Republic BIT, which unlike NAFTA or other 
more recent investment treaties considered above, does not include a right to regulate provision 
nor any provisions addressing policy concerns besides investment protection. The claimant 
argued that the Slovak Republic’s adoption of a constitutional amendment, which prohibited 
the cross-border transport of non-bottled water, violated the BIT.  
 
132 SD Myers, Inc v Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (13 November 2000) paras 220–1. 
133 ibid para 255. 
134 ibid (Sep Op Schwartz) para 115. 
135 William Ralph Clayton v Canada, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (17 March 2015) PCA Case No 2009-
04, paras 450–2, 591, 594, 600–4, 696–7, 724–5. Compare: Dissenting Opinion of Professor Donald McRae. 




In determining whether the constitutional amendment complied with the 
reasonableness strand of the FET standard, the Tribunal began by emphasizing that ‘Investment 
treaty arbitration tribunals owe deference to States in determining what serves as a legitimate 
public purpose … the presumption is that State conduct seeks to attain a legitimate common 
good’.137 Applying this approach to the case at hand, the Tribunal found that ‘Environmental 
preservation, public health, and seeking to regulate the use of natural resources in an informed 
and optimal fashion all represent core State functions and thus legitimate policy objectives’.138 
Significantly, the Tribunal also accepted that ‘States need not wait for their natural resources 
to be at risk or depleted to take action. Precautionary measures are more than appropriate with 
respect to vital resources such as water’.139 Subsequently, in scrutinizing whether the impugned 
measures had a reasonable relationship to these legitimate public purposes, the Tribunal 
emphasized that ‘it is not the role of an arbitral tribunal to “weigh the wisdom of legislation” 
… arbitral tribunals must pay deference to the choices States make when deciding how to 
implement policy objectives’.140  
Overall, these remarks suggest that even older-style investment treaties are correctly 
interpreted as preserving States’ autonomy to determine which regulatory aims to pursue. 
While the case does not squarely address autonomy concerning the level at which to pursue 
permissible aims, the remarks of the Tribunal, particularly regarding the permissibility of 
precautionary action, suggest that investment treaties should be interpreted as preserving this 
aspect of regulatory autonomy. 
 
C. Does the Argument Hold for Older Investment Treaties? 
 
As many of the provisions considered above are only found in investment treaties concluded 
in the last 15 years or so, it might be wondered whether the approach advocated for in this 
article is similarly applicable to older investment treaties. Such older treaties typically only 
refer, in their preambles, to aims of economic growth or prosperity, and their substantive 
provisions are limited to issues of investment protection.141 Nevertheless, there are several 
reasons why the claim remains applicable to older investment treaties, despite their not having 
the same explicit textual basis to support an interpretation favouring State autonomy in setting 
the level of protection for permissible regulatory aims.  
First, the right to regulate matters falling within a State’s domestic jurisdiction, of which 
autonomy to determine the level of protection is a part, is an inherent aspect of sovereignty.142 
While investment treaties clearly place constraints on the manner in which the right to regulate 
is exercised, they ‘were never intended to do away with their signatories’ right to regulate’.143 
Perhaps the best evidence of this is that tribunals have frequently interpreted the investment 
protections contained in older treaties in light of the regulatory powers retained by States, 
despite there being little in the text of these treaties that explicitly preserves regulatory space. 
The Muszynianka spółka z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością v Slovak Republic Award, 
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138 ibid para 550. 
139 ibid para 553. 
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discussed above, is a recent example of this. Another example is the widespread acceptance 
over the last fifteen years of a police powers doctrine within case law concerning indirect 
expropriation, again almost entirely under older treaties that do not address the relationship 
between indirect expropriation and other regulatory aims.144  
Seen in this light, the suggestion that investment treaties should be interpreted as 
preserving States’ autonomy to determine the level at which to pursue permissible regulatory 
aims amounts to an application of interpretative approaches that have already been adopted by 
a significant number of tribunals under older treaties.  
Second, as Federico Ortino has argued, the purpose of older investment treaties, where 
the preamble only refers to economic development or prosperity, can be interpreted in an 
evolutionary manner to encompass the broader and more balanced notion of sustainable 
development.145 This, in turn, has direct implications for State autonomy in setting the level of 
protection, because the concept of sustainable development leaves States with substantial 
discretion to determine ‘the appropriate balance between [the partially conflicting interests of] 
economic growth, environmental protection and social development’.146  
Overall, this Part has made the case that investment treaties are, properly interpreted, 
consistent with the idea that States retain autonomy to determine the desired level of protection 
for permissible regulatory aims. The next Part will demonstrate that this has direct implications 
for the balancing techniques that should be utilized by adjudicators, and, accordingly, for 
certain clarifications that States, as treaty drafters, should adopt. 
 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR OPERATIONALIZING HOST STATE AUTONOMY IN 
SELECTING THE LEVEL OF PROTECTION: AGAINST PROPORTIONALITY 
BALANCING STRICTO SENSU 
 
This Part addresses a key area where investment treaties and arbitral jurisprudence can be 
refined to minimize the potential for adjudicatory second-guessing of the regulatory aims that 
States choose to pursue, including a specific level of protection for a regulatory aim. It suggests 
that treaty drafters should remove the basis that currently exists, within the FET and indirect 
expropriation standards, for direct balancing of the regulatory interests furthered by a State 
measure against the measure’s impact on protected investments.  
As Henckels and Ortino, among others, have previously argued in the investment treaty 
context, where a proportionality-based test extends beyond considering whether a measure is 
necessary, to asking whether the costs of a measure outweigh, or are disproportionate to, the 
regulatory benefits of the measure, a State’s ability to decide which regulatory goals to pursue 
is undermined. In contrast, adjudicatory scrutiny that does not go beyond the necessity, or least 
restrictive means, stage of analysis, avoids putting into question the regulatory aim pursued by 
a State, and confines itself to scrutinizing the means utilized for pursuing the desired regulatory 
aim.147 This was a key lesson emerging from the analysis of WTO necessity jurisprudence in 
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Part III, which has, despite some ambiguities, been limited to a least restrictive means test, and 
has avoided second-guessing the regulatory objectives pursued by WTO members, including 
the level of protection pursued by a member.  
This Part demonstrates that regulators can have no such confidence in the investment 
treaty context, where the two most commonly invoked standards, FET and the protection 
against indirect expropriation, are both increasingly being interpreted in ways that provide for 
proportionality balancing stricto sensu, and, accordingly, for adjudicators potentially second-
guessing States’ regulatory goals. Certain treaty drafting clarifications to the two standards, 
intended to safeguard regulatory space, have also, counterproductively, provided a clear basis 
for proportionality balancing stricto sensu, and thus the potential downgrading of States’ 
regulatory aims. 
Until relatively recently only a handful of investment treaty awards had endorsed the 
proposition that the FET standard includes a free-standing requirement that a State’s measures 
must be proportionate, taking into account the regulatory aim pursued and the impact on 
protected investments.148 However, in recent years, and mostly in the context of the numerous 
disputes concerning European States’ changes to renewable energy subsidies, several tribunals 
have endorsed such a requirement in order to satisfy the FET standard.149 In contrast, one 
tribunal in the renewables cases has – correctly, it is suggested – questioned whether a free-
standing requirement of proportionality forms part of the FET standard, particularly where 
general legislative measures are at issue.150  
Some tribunals in renewable energy disputes have also suggested that proportionality 
is a relevant consideration when applying the stability and legitimate expectations components 
of FET.151 For example, numerous tribunals have held that changes made to a regulatory regime 
designed to attract investors to a sector must not be disproportionate, having regard to the 
regulatory aim pursued by the changes and the burden placed on investors who have reasonably 
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Group, SA v Colombia, ICSID Case No UNCT/18/1, Award (12 March 2021) paras 449–51, 492–5. Some of 
these remarks have concerned the obligation not to impair investments through unreasonable measures, however 
tribunals have emphasized that the requirement of proportionality is part of both the non-impairment and FET 
standards: eg Hyrdo Energy v Spain, paras 567–8, 573; Cavalum v Spain, paras 410–11, 414. Other tribunals have 
referred to proportionality but appeared to apply it as a least restrictive means test, eg an obligation to have the 
minimum negative effect on the competing interests protected by the State’s investment treaty obligations in order 
to achieve a permissible regulatory aim: eg RREEF Infrastructure (GP) Limited v Spain, ICSID Case No 
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relied on the prior regulatory scheme when investing.152 A requirement to avoid 
disproportionality when altering a regulatory regime that has been relied on by investors is 
significantly less wide-ranging than a requirement that all State conduct must be proportionate 
to the regulatory aim pursued in order to comply with the FET standard.153 
At the level of treaty drafting, a range of responses could limit the role for 
proportionality balancing stricto sensu, and potential second-guessing of States’ regulatory 
aims, within the FET standard. One option would be to omit any reference to FET, and to the 
extent that treaty drafters wish to reaffirm protections contained in the international minimum 
standard, such as the protection against denial of justice, to specify these elements in an 
exhaustive manner.154 This drafting strategy may remove the basis for the link that has been 
established by arbitral interpretations between a reference to FET and concepts such as 
proportionality or an absence of disproportionality. Another option used in some recent treaties 
is to retain a reference to FET but to specify its contents exhaustively.155  
Whether this approach will be successful in preventing States’ regulatory aims from 
being second-guessed remains to be seen. If States provide for FET, they could attempt to 
preclude strict balancing, for example by providing that a measure will only breach the FET 
standard where an alternative measure, which would make an equivalent contribution to the 
relevant regulatory aim but be less restrictive of the interests protected by the FET standard, 
was reasonably available to the State.156 As was shown in Part III, requiring a complainant to 
identify an alternative measure that was reasonably available and would make an equivalent 
contribution to the relevant regulatory aim, but be less restrictive of the competing treaty-
protected interest of trade liberalization, has been a key method by which WTO jurisprudence 
has preserved members’ regulatory autonomy.  
The protection against indirect expropriation has also been interpreted by arbitral 
tribunals in a manner that provides a strong basis for proportionality balancing stricto sensu. 
Specifically, in distinguishing non-compensable exercises of a State’s police powers from 
indirect expropriations that must be compensated, tribunals have increasingly referred to a 
requirement that, in order to fall within the police powers exception, a measure must be 
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Badajoz GmbH v Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/15/38, Award (31 July 2019) paras 316–18, 462. RWE Innogy 
GmbH v Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/14/34, Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability, and Certain Issues of Quantum 
(30 December 2019) paras 570–1, 589, 598–600, 649. PV Investors v Spain, PCA Case No 2012-14, Final Award 
(28 February 2020) paras 582–3, 624. BayWa.r.e. Renewable Energy GmbH v Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/15/16, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability and Directions on Quantum (2 December 2019) paras 460–3. Eurus Energy 
Holdings Corporation v Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/16/4, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability (17 March 2021) 
paras 335–8. Eiser Infrastructure Ltd v Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/13/36, Award (4 May 2017) para 370, 
approving Charanne B.V. v Spain, SCC Case No  062/2012, Award (21 January 2016) paras 514, 517. See also 
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used as interpretative standards in investment dispute settlement procedures’: eg Brazil–UAE BIT (2019) art 4(3).  
155 CETA art 8.10(2). EU–Vietnam IPA (2019) art 2.5(2); EU–Singapore IPA (2018) art 2.4(2). EU–Mexico 
Global Agreement (2020) ch 17 art 15(2). Rwanda–UAE BIT art 4(2). UAE–Israel BIT art 2(3). 
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proportionate to the public interest pursued, taking account of the impact on protected 
investments.157  
One of the starkest examples is PL Holdings v Poland, where the Tribunal considered 
the proportionality of measures adopted by a banking regulator purportedly to address 
wrongdoing by the claimant, by asking whether the measures satisfied the tests of suitability, 
necessity and, finally, not being ‘excessive in that its advantages are outweighed by its 
disadvantages’.158 Another oft-cited example is Tecmed v Mexico, where the Tribunal, in 
determining whether Mexico’s conduct constituted an indirect expropriation, noted that it had 
to consider: 
whether such actions or measures are proportional to the public interest presumably 
protected thereby and to the protection legally granted to investments … There must be 
a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the charge or weight imposed to 
the foreign investor and the aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure.159 
Significantly, the Tribunal proceeded to weigh the public interest pursued by the decision to 
deny the renewal of the operating permit for the claimant’s hazardous waste facility against the 
impact on the claimant’s investment. Within this exercise, the Tribunal emphasized that the 
public opposition to the landfill’s location, which it determined was the real reason for the non-
renewal of the permit, was not massive, and could not justify the decision to prevent the facility 
being operated.160  
Engaging in this kind of balancing exercise is controversial because it involves ‘placing 
the competing interests on a scale [namely the regulatory aim pursued by a State and the 
interests protected by relevant investment treaty protections] and effectively determining 
whether one takes precedence over another’.161 In contrast, under a necessity test, so long as 
the regulatory aim pursued by a State was a permissible one, adjudicators would not be 
permitted to second-guess that aim and would be limited to asking whether there were 
alternative, reasonable available means for achieving the goal that were less restrictive of the 
competing interests protected by relevant investment treaty obligations. As was seen in Part 
III, the WTO necessity jurisprudence has, despite some ambiguities, generally amounted to a 
least restrictive means test. Importantly, despite the references to ‘weighing and balancing’, 
WTO adjudicators have avoided directly balancing the public interest pursued by a measure 
against its trade restrictiveness, whereby the regulatory aim pursued by a member could be 
downgraded. Investment tribunals can learn from this jurisprudence, by avoiding direct 
balancing of the regulatory benefits of a measure against its impact on protected investments. 
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Treaty drafting over the past 15 years in relation to protection against indirect 
expropriation has also, and problematically, introduced an explicit basis for balancing of the 
public interest pursued by a measure against the measure’s impact on protected investments or 
even a particular claimant investor. This has occurred within the expropriation annexes that 
first appeared in the United States and Canadian model investment treaties of 2004, to provide 
further guidance on the distinction between indirect expropriations and non-compensable 
regulatory measures, which have since been drawn upon with some modifications by a wide 
range of States.  
When providing for a police powers exception, by excluding non-discriminatory 
regulatory conduct from constituting an indirect expropriation ‘except in rare circumstances’, 
several States have repeatedly utilized language that either refers to proportionality or 
disproportionality, or which is prone to be interpreted as permitting proportionality balancing 
stricto sensu.  
For example, South Korea has included the following language in many of its 
investment treaties of the last decade:  
Except in rare circumstances, such as, for example, when an action or a series of actions 
is extremely severe or disproportionate in light of its purpose or effect, non-
discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect 
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, the environment, and 
real estate price stabilization … do not constitute indirect expropriations.162 
In defining such ‘rare circumstances’, this provision instructs adjudicators to consider whether 
a measure is ‘disproportionate in light of its purpose or effect’. This would most likely involve 
weighing the benefits to be secured by a measure, perhaps in light of an assessment of the 
relative importance of the relevant regulatory aim, against the effect of the measure on the 
claimant’s investment. This interpretation is confirmed by other parts of the annex, which 
clarify that, in determining whether a measure constitutes an indirect expropriation, 
consideration must be given to ‘the economic impact of the government action’, ‘the extent to 
which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed 
expectations’, and: 
the character of the government action, including its objectives and context. Relevant 
considerations could include whether the government action imposes a special sacrifice 
on the particular investor or investment that exceeds what the investor or investment 
should be expected to endure for the public interest.163 
In several of its treaties South Korea has expanded on this wording by referring to ‘whether the 
investor bears a disproportionate burden’.164  
These features of the relevant annexes leave no doubt that, in making the case-by-case 
determination of whether a measure constitutes an indirect expropriation, or should be covered 
by the language indicating that non-discriminatory regulatory actions are generally not indirect 
expropriations, adjudicators are being instructed to weigh the regulatory objectives furthered 
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by the impugned measure against the burden imposed on the complainant investor.165 There is 
nothing in these provisions that would prevent an adjudicator from determining a measure to 
be ‘extremely severe or disproportionate’, and thus constitute an indirect expropriation, even 
where the measure passes a least restrictive means test. Relatedly, the provision leaves open 
the possibly that adjudicators might find that an alternative measure, making a lesser 
contribution to the selected regulatory aim but involving a lesser burden on the claimant 
investor, could have been utilized by the State. 
It bears emphasizing that it is not only South Korea which had adopted such an 
approach. For example, several investment treaties concluded by the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) refer, in the paragraph of the expropriation annex concerning ‘the 
character of the government action’, to ‘whether the action is disproportionate to the public 
purpose’ pursued.166 Australia’s FTAs with Indonesia and Malaysia also contain the same 
wording.167 Similarly, some newer Chinese investment treaties, when considering ‘the 
character and purpose of a measure’, refer to whether the measure ‘was proportionate to its 
purpose’.168 A handful of other recent investment treaties, in provisions excluding non-
discriminatory regulatory measures from constituting indirect expropriation, also refer to 
measures that are ‘disproportionate’ to the regulatory purpose pursued.169  
As is more widely known, the equivalent paragraph in recent investment treaties 
concluded by the EU provides:  
except in the rare circumstance when the impact of a measure or series of measures is 
so severe in light of its purpose that it appears manifestly excessive, non-discriminatory 
measures of a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations.170 
The reference to the ‘impact of a measure’ appears to require consideration of the impact of a 
measure on the particular claimant investor.171 As Ortino has highlighted, the annex does not 
make it clear whether adjudicators should employ a necessity test, (eg whether the impugned 
measure involves the lowest possible burden on protected investments to achieve the relevant 
policy aim) or some form of cost-benefit analysis, which, for example, asks if the impact on a 
claimant investor is ‘manifestly excessive’ in light of the regulatory aim pursued.172 There is a 
risk that a non-discriminatory measure pursuing what a tribunal considered to be a relatively 
unimportant purpose and which placed a heavy burden on a claimant investor, might be 
classified as ‘manifestly excessive’, (and thus as an indirect expropriation), even where no 
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alternative measure involving a lesser restriction of the treaty-protected interest of investment 
protection was reasonably available.173 
The lessons to be learnt for drafting provisions concerning indirect expropriation are as 
follows. First, if States do not intend that the regulatory purpose of a measure should be directly 
weighed against, and potentially downgraded in light of, the competing interest of investment 
protection, they should make this clear. For example, expropriation annexes could make it clear 
that if a measure is to be considered ‘manifestly excessive’ or ‘extremely severe and 
disproportionate’, the tribunal must be able to identify an alternative measure which was 
reasonably available, would have made an equivalent regulatory contribution, and been 
significantly less restrictive of the treaty-protected interest of investment protection.174  
Another approach is that found in more recent Canadian investment treaties, which 
specify that the ‘rare circumstances’ in which a non-discriminatory measure designed and 
applied to protect a legitimate regulatory objective can constitute  indirect expropriation refers 
to situations  ‘when a measure … is so severe in the light of its purpose that it cannot be 
reasonably viewed as having been adopted in good faith’.175 This wording suggests that only 
measures that ‘cannot be reasonably viewed as having been adopted in good faith’ could 
amount to ‘rare circumstances’, and thus constitute indirect expropriation. This may mean that 
there is no real scope for weighing the regulatory interests furthered by a measure against the 
interest of investment protection, unless it is determined that the measure ‘cannot be reasonably 
viewed as having been adopted in good faith’. Canada advanced such an interpretation in a 
recent non-disputing party submission in the Eco Oro v Colombia dispute under the Canada–
Colombia FTA, submitting such wording ‘reflects the deference given to States in their 
determination of the level of protection they seek to achieve and the regulatory choices to 
achieve these objectives’.176  
Another more clear-cut option, which has occasionally been used by some States in the 
last 10-15 years, is to remove ‘except in rare circumstances’ altogether, leaving the less 
qualified guidance that: ‘Non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed 
and applied to achieve legitimate public welfare objectives, such as the protection of public 
health, safety, and the environment do not constitute [indirect] expropriation’.177 Such 
provisions introduce a clearer hierarchy of values, according to which legitimate public welfare 
objectives take priority over the interest of investment protection, subject to a limited form of 
scrutiny of the means employed to achieve such objectives. Importantly, this approach removes 
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any textual basis for directly weighing the regulatory benefits secured by a measure against its 
impact on protected investments.  
This Part has suggested that proportionality balancing stricto sensu within the FET and 
indirect expropriation standards, which involves weighing the regulatory benefits secured by a 
measure against its impact on protected investments (or even a particular claimant investor), 
has the potential to undermine State autonomy in determining which regulatory aims to pursue. 
Proposals have been made, partly inspired by the earlier analysis of necessity jurisprudence in 
WTO law, for replacing it with a least restrictive means test. This would reorient investment 
law by making the choice of regulatory aims, and the level at which to pursue such aims, largely 
non reviewable. Adjudicatory scrutiny of the means employed does not undermine States’ 




The pace of reforms in the investment treaty regime in recent years leaves little doubt that many 
States remain concerned about its impact on their regulatory space, and options once viewed 
as marginal, such as widespread exit from investment treaties, are increasingly on the table. 
Against this backdrop, this article has analyzed one foundational idea that has often been 
touched on but not fully explored: namely, that despite undertaking investment protection 
obligations, States retain autonomy to select which regulatory aims to pursue, and, crucially, 
the level at which to pursue permissible aims. Giving effect to this idea, which finds support in 
a range of provisions in newer investment treaties, will require rethinking how investment 
protection obligations are construed. In particular, there is an increasing need to allow in some 
circumstances a State’s broader public welfare interests to take priority over investment 
protection. 
A core claim of this article is that proportionality balancing stricto sensu has no place 
in a setting where States retain the ability to determine and implement their desired level of 
protection for permissible regulatory goals. Accordingly, this article has made proposals for 
how the key investment treaty standards of FET and the protection against indirect 
expropriation could be reoriented to reflect a least restrictive means test. These proposals can 
inform arbitral approaches under most existing investment treaties, which do not require 
tribunals to engage in proportionality balancing stricto sensu. WTO necessity jurisprudence 
provides an inspiration for this, as it has a wealth of experience in balancing treaty-protected 
interests of trade liberalization with competing public welfare interests. Moreover, it has 
managed to achieve a desirable compromise between States retaining the ability to pursue their 
desired level of protection for permissible regulatory aims, whilst being subject to significant 
disciplines regarding the means utilized. While there are some difficulties with the approach, 
within WTO jurisprudence, to the concept of the level of protection, these are not so significant 
as to suggest that the concept should not be drawn upon for inspiration in the investment treaty 
context. 
For some, this will still give too much priority to investment protection, since 
permissible, and often pressing, public welfare interests would have to be achieved though 
means involving the least possible restriction of the competing interests protected by relevant 
investment treaty obligations.178 The requirement that alternative measures must be reasonably 
available and make an equivalent contribution to achieving the State’s regulatory aim, 
combined with a degree of deference in making these assessments, as is practised in WTO 
necessity jurisprudence, can address this concern to some extent.179 An alternative, which 
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would preserve State autonomy in setting the level of protection and address concerns about 
the potentially intrusive nature of necessity testing, would be to reconceive investment treaty 
standards so that they only require a State’s measures to be non-discriminatory and have a 
rational connection to a permissible policy aim.180  
Another more fundamental objection to any form of balancing exercise, including a 
necessity test, in the investment treaty regime is that due to the lack of standing afforded to 
other actors affected by foreign investment activities (eg local communities), such third party 
interests are not adequately represented and thus not taken into account.181 While there is 
substance in this objection, investor-State arbitration, or standing investor-State tribunals, are 
likely to remain with us in some form for the foreseeable future.182 Accordingly, there is a 
pressing need to offer an interpretation of key investment protection standards that better 
protects the ability of States to determine and implement their own regulatory priorities, 
including levels of protection. Moreover, even in a system that afforded standing to other 
affected actors (eg local communities), or a system that only permitted State–State dispute 
settlement, the question of States’ autonomy to determine and implement a desired level of 
protection for permissible regulatory aims would still arise. 
Some might be concerned that these proposals would downgrade or relativize 
investment protections traditionally understood as absolute (eg FET and the protection against 
indirect expropriation). However, it must be remembered that these standards have increasingly 
been construed in ways that take account of the regulatory competences retained by States. In 
addition, investment treaties are increasingly drafted in ways that make it clear that investment 
protection is not their only concern, nor necessarily the interest that is to be given priority where 
trade-offs are required. It is suggested that the proposals made in this article show that 
investment law can be reoriented to respect States’ autonomy to determine the level at which 
to pursue permissible regulatory aims. 
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